Writing at the Keghart blog, Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies researcher Vicken Babkenian argues that it is, literally, impossible to deny the Armenian Genocide. Since the word “genocide” was coined by Raphael Lemkin to specifically describe what happened to Armenians during WWI and to Jews during WWII, by using the word “genocide” one recognizes – even if saying “the Armenian Genocide was a lie” – the Armenian Genocide (and the Holocaust):

It all began when I was cutting an Orange for my niece when she asked me why the name Orange is both a color and a fruit. After doing some research, I discovered that the root of the word Orange in the English language is derived from the fruit. In other words the Etymology of the color and the fruit is interconnected. No one can argue that the fruit Orange is not Orange.

As someone who has studied the Armenian Genocide over a number of years, I could not help but familiarize myself with the etymology of the word Genocide. I discovered that the word genocide is from the roots genos (Greek for family, tribe, race, a people, a nation) and –cide (Latin – occidere or cideo – to Massacre, Kill, exterminate). I looked up the word in the Oxford dictionary and found the definition to be “the extermination of a race”. I then recalled that this definition of the word ‘genocide’ had been used by contemporary eyewitnesses, diplomats, historians, journalists to describe what was happening to the Armenians during WWI. Lord James Bryce in 1915 called it “the Extermination of a Race” in a New York Times article. If the word ‘genocide’ had been coined before WWI, then that one word would have been used, instead of the five words which mean the same thing.

I then conducted some research on Raphael Lemkin, “The founder of the genocide convention” and on the genesis of the word ‘genocide’ which he coined in 1944. In his manuscript titled “Totally unofficial”, Lemkin wrote:

“In 1915 . . . I began . . . to read more history to study whether national, religious, or racial groups as such were being destroyed. The truth came out after the war. In Turkey, more than 1,200,000 Armenians were put to death . . . After the end of the war, some 150 Turkish war criminals were arrested and interned by the British Government on the island of Malta . . . Then one day, I read in the newspapers that all Turkish war criminals were to be released. I was shocked. A nation that killed and the guilty persons were set free . . . I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world”

I soon reached the conclusion that the word genocide is etymologically interconnected with the tragedy of the Armenians, just like the word Orange is to the fruit of the same name. The man who coined the word genocide had in large part based it on the Armenian catastrophe. He even stated on national television “that it happened to the Armenians.” 

[…] 

I searched online to learn which countries had actually signed and ratified the Genocide Convention. I discovered that most countries in the world had done so, including the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Israel and so on. I concluded that by ratifying the convention they had in fact recognized that the Armenian holocaust was in fact a genocide.

Yes, I use the word ‘holocaust’ because that word was used to describe what was happening to the Armenians during the Abdul Hamid Massacres, Adana Massacres and the Armenian genocide by contemporary writers. William Walker Rockwell in an article titled “the Total of Armenian and Syrian Dead” in the New York Times Current History February 1916, wrote “If the ghosts of the Christian civilians who have perished miserably in Turkey since the commencement of the great holocaust should march down Fifth Avenue twenty abreast there might be a million of them … for most of them will be women and children”.

The Armenian genocide has been recognized by the majority of the nations of the world and we didn’t even know it. If those countries who have ratified the genocide convention deny that the Armenians were victims of genocide, then they should either terminate their participation to the convention, or have the convention change the word ‘genocide’ to something else which is not intrinsically connected to the Armenian slaughter.

Denying that Armenians were victims of genocide is akin to denying that an Orange is Orange. It is insane and illogical. For those who believe that what happened to the Armenians should not be termed a ‘genocide’, should have convinced Raphael Lemkin not to base the word on what had happened to the Armenians. Unfortunately for them, it is too late, by signing the genocide convention; most of the world has already recognized the Armenian genocide.

Too short for Armenians and too long for the Turkish government, a two-hour CNN documentary by Christiane Amanpour on genocide includes a 45-second mention of the WWI extermination of Ottoman Empire’s indigenous Armenian population. Premiered on December 4, 2008, Scream Bloody Murder has made many Armenian bloggers angry, leading them to recall Hitler’s rhetoric for impunity, “Who, after all, remembers the Armenians?”

Armenia-based blogger, photographer and designer Arsineh had concerns even before watching the documentary. Writing on Ars Eye View, she says:

[…]

I’m preparing to watch the program for myself, but given this much prior information, I have to ask. If you are going to cover the epidemic of genocide, starting with the campaign to criminalize genocide, continue to show the struggle so many have endured to (as you titled your program) “SCREAM BLOODY MURDER” while the world turned a deaf ear only to allow genocide to continue around the world, shouldn’t you be talking about the biggest cover up of genocide, the very one which inspired Lemkin to coin the word, the very one which also inspired Adolf Hitler to follow through with the Holocaust? Afterall, it’s this denial that scares CNN from ever using the word “Genocide” in their reporting on related matters.

[…]

She also posts a video question to CNN.

Writing in detail, West of Igdir says a previous CNN press release suggested the coverage of the Armenian Genocide was going to be more intense.

[…]

The release specifically mentioned Armenia as one of the cases of genocide it would be examining. This naturally created some excitement that finally a major news organization would be dedicating a program partly to the so often overlooked Armenian Genocide of 1915 and inform a nationwide audience about it.

[…]

I had been feeling hopeful about the documentary and might have given it more of a pass on this omition until I saw this interactive map on the section of Scream Bloody Murder section of CNN’s website about the world’s killing fields. It appears that despite the fact when it had first been announced Armenia was prominently mentioned as one of the examples of genocide that would be covered, it was overlooked as being pinpointed on the interactive map as an example of genocide.

[..]

Clearly the documentary did not go unnoticed in Turkey, despite the fact it says almost nothing about the Armenian Genocide, as the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet yesterday declared “Genocide feature worrisome.”

[…]

Sevana at Life in the Armenian Diaspora is also unhappy.

When will this second class genocide victim status end? I guess CNN is afraid that CNN-Turk will be cut off the air if they include the Armenians… how very, very sad.

Another diasporan voice, Seta’s Armenian Blog posts an action alert by the Armenian National Committee of America to protest CNN’s almost exclusion of the Armenian Genocide.

The full post is available at Global Voices Online.

A liberal Turkish newspaper is making fun of their government. According to Radical, Turkey’s government has opened a website titled There is No Armenian Ani.

The sarcastic news is actually confronting the Turkish government for launching a website about the historic Armenian city of Ani – now on Turkish territory. The website features information about Ani’s churches and archaeology.

But the word “Armenian” is absent from the entire content of http://www.ani.gov.tr/, except for some bibliography sources.

While I have been silent on the recent developments of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, it doesn’t mean I have not been following the news. My silence reflects a complicated mixture of cautious optimism, confusion, excitement, fear, cynicism, and a busy schedule (which includes observing the US presidential elections). We live in historic and unpredictable times. These unknown globalized waves can translate into almost anything in Nagorno-Karabakh – from long-term solutions to further conflict.

Internationally, Obama’s election, Georgia’s unsuccessful bid for South Ossetia, Turkey’s continuous struggle to join the European Union, and international – particularly US and Russian – interest in the South Caucasus have contributed to the recent developments in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, which was vocalized in a set of principles that Azerbaijan and Armenia signed in Moscow in early November 2008. One can only hope that Armenian and Azeri leaders will make tough choices and negotiate for a solution. Locally, both countries have a great chance to make the piece.

Background:

For those of you who don’t know, Nagorno-Karabakh is an indigenous Armenian region (called Artsakh by locals) within the country of Azerbaijan. This small territory declared its independence from Soviet Azerbaijan in 1991, less than seventy years after USSR chief Joseph Stalin gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The conflict escalated into a war between Armenia/Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, killing thousands of people and leaving many more homeless.

Today, Nagorno-Karabakh is an internationally unrecognized republic with a common border with mother Armenia. Nationalist sentiment is at peak high in Azerbaijan where most people see Armenians as invaders and aggressors. The sentiment was reflected in December 2005, when a contingent of Azerbaijan’s army reduced the largest medieval Armenian cemetery – Djulfa – to dust. (Official Azerbaijan until this day denies the destruction, even though it was videotaped.) While most Armenians are nowadays much less antagonistic against Azerbaijan, during the war, in 1992, armed Armenian groups massacred a few hundred Azeri civilians when fighting in Khojalu, although both official Armenia and some Azeri sources question some of the facts of the tragedy: particularly suggesting that Azeri forces deliberately banned Khojalu’s residents to leave through a humanitarian corridor the Armenian army had left for civilians. Furthermore, Armenians claim that the conflict itself started in Azerbaijan when mobs attacked hundreds of Armenian citizens, killing several dozen, in their homes in Sumgayit in 1988 while the Police stood by. Azeris claim that there were riots against their kin in southern Armenia at the same time.

Armenian and Azeri Attitudes:

In short, both Armenia and Azerbaijan see themselves as the victim and the enemy as the aggressor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And while abuses by both sides have been almost always symmetrical in the conflict, official Azerbaijan – until recently – has been using both verbal threats and disproportional acts of destruction. Threats have included official statements by Azerbaijan’s president to win Nagorno-Karabakh back by any price, including by war, and predictions by a senior Azeri military chief that Armenia will not exist in several years. Disproportional acts of destruction by Azerbaijan have included  total elimination of all ancient indigenous Armenian monuments on its territory, especially in the exclave of Nakhichevan (another region granted to Azerbaijan by Stalin). This is not only inconsistent with Azerbaijan’s self-promotion as “the world’s most tolerant country,” but is also an act of cultural genocide (what I call “genocidal vandalism” in my honors thesis) which in no way contributes to the peace process.

Armenia’s diplomacy in the conflict has been more moderate, which may be a reflection of the following: Armenia’s victory in the early 1990s war, oil-rich Azerbaijan’s military boom, and limited open international support for Armenia in the conflict. Moderate diplomacy, nonetheless, hasn’t resulted in worldwide condemnation against Azerbaijan for blockading Armenia (although until George W. Bush, the United States didn’t give military aid to Azerbaijan). And in general, the world has been very careful not to take sides in the conflict (neither in the case of the Khojalu massacre by  Armenians nor in the recent case of Djulfa’s destruction by Azeris): an approach which is difficult to determine as productive or not.

Ideal Solutions and Militant Positions:

One reason why it has been difficult to defend one position or another has been the polarized Armenian and Azerbaijani demands, a “normal” situation in every conflict.

Azerbaijan wants to return its borders to pre-1991, entirely reversing what the bloody war did before the 1994 cease fire. It says that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh will be Azerbaijan’s citizens, but that they will never have the right or the option to succeed from Azerbaijan. In short, the legal concept of “territorial integrity” has been the supreme law and the sacred doctrine in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has about a million refugees who live in horrible conditions. Azerbaijan hopes that all these people will return to their homes, now under Armenian control. Armenians say and an Amnesty International report agreed last year, that Azerbaijan is deliberately ignoring its refugees and making their lives even miserable in order to gain international support.

Armenia says that Nagorno-Karabakh’s return to Azeri control would mean giving 150,000 Armenian lives into captivity. If Azerbaijan reduces unarmed ancient Armenian graves to dust, what will it do with live Armenians? Many, if not most, Armenians insist on also keeping the seven regions around Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenian forces gained control of during the war. While not many Armenians lived on these lands during the war, there are hundreds of ancient monuments that Armenians see as proof for their historic claim to the land. Some Azeris criticize Armenians for capitalizing on history and, thus, denying Azeri inhabitants the right to return to their homes. Some Armenians respond that Azerbaijan is trying to capitalize on rewriting history, and denying indigenous Armenians their right to self-determination.

On surface, Azerbaijan doesn’t agree to any solution that will let Nagorno-Karabakh be separate from it. In the same way, many Armenians consider the possibility of giving much of the seven surrounding territories back to Azerbaijan a loss. Neither party considers all the damage that has happened – and will continue to happen – to people in both countries because of the unresolved conflict. Nationalism has overridden cost-benefit analysis (with a human rights perspective) or mutual respect for the rights of the other.

Undemocratic regimes in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have perhaps contributed to the conflict. Wars unite populations, and perhaps the conflict has worked well for both Azeri and Armenian political elites. A few months ago, a former Azerbaijani serviceman (now studying in the United States) told me that Azerbaijan’s economic elite is using nationalism to hold power in the country. While Azerbaijan’s economy is booming due to oil exports, ordinary people are not experiencing change in their lives. Hatred against Armenia, some Azeris say, is the perfect tool for Azerbaijan’s rich class to distract the majority’s attention. And in Armenia, between 1992 and 1994, people would die from hunger and economic desperation. While the government was blaming everything on the war, several government-protected families were illegally becoming superrich. According to widespread claims, independent Armenia’s regime (both Levon-Ter Petrosyan’s and Kocharyan’s) elites stole billions of dollars from the people of Armenia through neoliberal privatizations of several industries and by other means.

Time for Change?

But even undemocratic regimes can solve problems, especially when their hegemony and reputation is at stake. In the last few months, there have been interesting developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First, Azerbaijan’s ally and Armenia’s historic enemy Turkey demonstrated diplomatic will to cooperate with Armenia. Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul accepted his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to watch a soccer match between both countries in September 2008. The historic event, deemed as “football diplomacy,” was followed by recent meetings brokered by Moscow between Armenia and Azerbaijan where, for the first time, leaders of both countries seemed to be pleased. More surprisingly, Turkey has been reducing its pro-Azerbaijan rhetoric while trying to become a mediator between its two South Caucasus neighbors.

Many Armenians, who are usually skeptical in international relations given their experience of genocide, are discouraged with the recent development. Skeptics see Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan, who came to power following a bloodshed during the March 2008 post-election protests, as trading his own presidency for a solution unbeneficial for Armenia. Turkey’s involvement in the process is less encouraging for the residents of Armenia, a country that Turkey has been blockading since the Karabakh conflict. 

While Turkey may not be a friend of Armenia, it sure has its interest in helping the Nagorno-Karabakh process. Turkey is under enormous pressure to open the border with Armenia (which Turkey thinks will help persuade US president-elect Barack Obama to back off from his pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide). It will be very hard to open the border, though, without solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, by helping to broker a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey’s current regime would silence the United States (and also its own ultranationalist deep state), have better prospects for joining the European Union, and make a claim to sort things out in the region (Turkey has surely expressed interest in brokering a deal between the United States and Iran, and unsuccessfully tried the same with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).

Azerbaijan may be more interested in solving the problem now than in the past. Authoritarian leader Ilham Aliyev, the son of Azerbaijan’s former, now deceased, president Heydar Aliyev, just won  a second (and final term) with the opposition boycotting the election (and giving him a perfect argument for a democratic victory). Not having to worry about reelection, Aliyev may be more interested in toning down his militant rhetoric. More importantly, the recent Georgian-Russian escalation over South Ossetia has likely demonstrated to Azerbaijan that war is not as good of a choice as Azerbaijan thought it might be. After all, Georgia not only didn’t win South Ossetia back, its attempt to get international sympathy faded away, if not being replaced with anger and distrust toward Tbilisi. Furthermore, the United States may want to partner with Azerbaijan even further more, especially in the case of an escalation with Iran, if it solves its problem with Armenia.

Armenia may be more inclined to change not only due to alleged pressure against president Sargsyan, but also due to the fact that an open border with Turkey will be a great asset for Armenia (Turkey thinks it may not be able to afford the border without a Karabakh solution). Furthermore, in two years, there won’t be many 18-year-olds in Armenia to qualify as soldiers. That’s because 1992-1994 are Armenia’s “dark and cold days,” when few families had children. So if there is to be war in the next four years, Armenia will have few bodies to fight. 

A fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan, nonetheless, is not desired (at least at this time) by any of the superpowers, especially by the United States. Back in July, when I met with the acting US Ambassador to Armenia, I heard extremely nice remarks about president Serzh Sargysan’s offer of watching football match with his Turkish counterpart. The United States is seeking stability, especially with the mess that the Iraq war has created. Russia is also interested in stability between Armenia (a strong ally) and Azerbaijan (an ally), especially since Moscow’s interest in the Baku oil. Thus, internationally speaking, prospects for a peaceful Karabakh deal are possible, if not real. 

Realist solutions:

Both sides need to accept that no solution is going to be perfect for either side. I don’t want to suggest what the solution should or will be, but it is clear what the solution cannot be. Azerbaijan cannot recover all the territories that it had before 1991; Armenia cannot retain all the territories that it gained after 1991. This is not a simple cliché, but a psychology that Azerbaijani and Armenian governments must start embedding in their populations. Any solution, though, would be a hard-sell both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The governments in both countries might want to employ the same tactic they have used for a long time – information wars. Instead of dehumanizing the enemy this time, Armenian and Azeri TV channels (both are government-controlled to a large degree) should broadcast stories that rehumanize their neighbors. This strategy hardly needs to be called ‘affirmative propaganda,’ because there are so many true stories of mutual help and respect that can help in bringing change. One thing that is clear is that a peaceful solution at this time would be great for Armenia, Azerbaijan, their neighbors and the world.

[the post below was a mass-email to an Armenian-Turkish group. It is being republished by the author’s permission]

An interesting report that appeared in the 4 November 2008 issue of Milli Gazete, the mouthpiece of the hardline-Islamist Felicity Party, says that the Turkish government plans to enact a “Law on National Archives” with the principal aim of “enabling Turkey to defend itself better” against “Armenian allegations of genocide.”  The report is entitled “Legal Armor Against Genocide.”

The Turkish government has indeed prepared a “Draft Bill on National Archives,” but it does not appear to be overtly related to the Armenian genocide.  To the best of my knowledge, Milli Gazete is the only publication that has presented the bill in this light.  In view of the political inclinations (extremely anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, and anti-West) and the very poor journalistic standards of this paper, the report may not be taken seriously.  Nonetheless, a closer look at the law (whose text in Turkish can be accessed at http://www.memurlar.net/haber/44086/) suggests that public access to key documents may be denied on grounds of “national security and interests” and “secrecy.”  Unlike the situation in the past, this denial of access will now enjoy “legal armor,” as Milli Gazete describes it.

The draft bill consists of four sections and 39 articles and, when enacted, will be the first law about state archives.  Most of the articles are related to the organization, functions, and responsibilities of a reorganized Directorate General of State Archives (DGSA); definitions of archival documents; and the protection, preservation, and classification of archival documents.  The bill states that the DGSA will have supervision authority over archival material in the custody of public institutions such as public universities, libraries, ministries, institutes, local governments, and so forth.  However, the bill exempts “the Office of the President, the Turkish National Assembly, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Organization” from direct supervision.  These agencies are required “to implement the principles stated in the law through their own organizational units.”

The bill creates four departments within the directorate, the two most important of which are the “Republican Archives Department” and the “Ottoman Archives Department.”  The other two departments are related to documentation and relations with foreign archive departments.  Several “consultative” entities such as legal counsels, public relations, human resources, and “strategy development” units are also enumerated in the new organization.

On the positive side, the bill establishes principles and guidelines that regulate the sorting and destruction of archival documents at even the lowest levels of government.  It also formally criminalizes the theft, willful destruction and adulteration, and trading of archival documents.

However, the bill also contains clauses that codify the potential denial of free public access to archival documents in the custody of all public agencies.  The clauses that are of most interest to this group are summarized or translated below.  My comments follow those.

The first three paragraphs of Article 25 state that archival documents “cannot be removed from their repositories” except under special circumstances, which are specified; that copies of the documents may be provided under certain circumstances; and that “documents which have been cataloged and whose last procedure is more than 30 years old” will be open for research.

The fourth paragraph of this article is the most interesting.  It says:

“(4) Archival documents that have been assigned some level of secrecy classification or whose publication may harm national security and interests, the country’s external relations, or the rights of individuals shall retain these attributes after they are transferred to the Directorate General and may not be opened for scholarly research.  The Directorate General may decide to remove secrecy classifications from certain archival documents in consultation with [the agency from which the archival document originated] and within the framework of laws.”

The fifth paragraph is also of interest (though standard): 

“(5) Access to archival documents by domestic and foreign real and corporate persons and the implementation of procedures and principles stated in this article shall be governed by a statute of regulations.”

This paragraph is typical of virtually all Turkish laws which pass on the responsibility of “implementation of procedures and principles” to lower levels of administration.  This provides deniability and vagueness in the case of laws that are known to be discriminatory in advance.  This is exactly the way the “Deportation Law” of 1915 and the “Wealth Tax Law” of 1942 (as well as the “Religious Foundations” laws of 2000 and 2007) were drafted: the laws did not mention the actual targets of the actions taken but statutes of regulations created at lower or local levels of administration targeted only certain groups.  This allowed the Ottoman and Turkish governments to deny charges that the laws they enacted were discriminatory against certain groups and to argue that “the laws were justified but the implementation went awry.”

In conclusion, although Milli Gazete’s claim that this bill is aimed at “self-defense” against Armenian genocide allegations is not readily apparent in the language of the bill, it is clear that the law provides substantial leeway to a wide range of Turkish government agencies to restrict selectively access to a very large set of sensitive documents.  The exemption from direct supervision given to “power agencies” such as the General Staff, the Presidency, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Intelligence Organization; together with the “secrecy” and “national security” exemptions of Article 25(4) and the vague implementation provisions through “statutes of regulations” provide sufficient tools to a fairly large and deep bureaucracy to deny access to any archival document on an arbitrarily selective basis.

The draft bill is expected to go to the National Assembly for discussion and enactment into law during the current legislative session.

An interesting report that appeared in the 4 November 2008 issue of Milli Gazete, the mouthpiece of the hardline-Islamist Felicity Party, says that the Turkish government plans to enact a “Law on National Archives” with the principal aim of “enabling Turkey to defend itself better” against “Armenian allegations of genocide.”  The report is entitled “Legal Armor Against Genocide.”

The Turkish government has indeed prepared a “Draft Bill on National Archives,” but it does not appear to be overtly related to the Armenian genocide.  To the best of my knowledge, Milli Gazete is the only publication that has presented the bill in this light.  In view of the political inclinations (extremely anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, and anti-West) and the very poor journalistic standards of this paper, the report may not be taken seriously.  Nonetheless, a closer look at the law (whose text in Turkish can be accessed at http://www.memurlar.net/haber/44086/) suggests that public access to key documents may be denied on grounds of “national security and interests” and “secrecy.”  Unlike the situation in the past, this denial of access will now enjoy “legal armor,” as Milli Gazete describes it.

The draft bill consists of four sections and 39 articles and, when enacted, will be the first law about state archives.  Most of the articles are related to the organization, functions, and responsibilities of a reorganized Directorate General of State Archives (DGSA); definitions of archival documents; and the protection, preservation, and classification of archival documents.  The bill states that the DGSA will have supervision authority over archival material in the custody of public institutions such as public universities, libraries, ministries, institutes, local governments, and so forth.  However, the bill exempts “the Office of the President, the Turkish National Assembly, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Organization” from direct supervision.  These agencies are required “to implement the principles stated in the law through their own organizational units.”

The bill creates four departments within the directorate, the two most important of which are the “Republican Archives Department” and the “Ottoman Archives Department.”  The other two departments are related to documentation and relations with foreign archive departments.  Several “consultative” entities such as legal counsels, public relations, human resources, and “strategy development” units are also enumerated in the new organization.

On the positive side, the bill establishes principles and guidelines that regulate the sorting and destruction of archival documents at even the lowest levels of government.  It also formally criminalizes the theft, willful destruction and adulteration, and trading of archival documents.

However, the bill also contains clauses that codify the potential denial of free public access to archival documents in the custody of all public agencies.  The clauses that are of most interest to this group are summarized or translated below.  My comments follow those.

The first three paragraphs of Article 25 state that archival documents “cannot be removed from their repositories” except under special circumstances, which are specified; that copies of the documents may be provided under certain circumstances; and that “documents which have been cataloged and whose last procedure is more than 30 years old” will be open for research.

The fourth paragraph of this article is the most interesting.  It says:

“(4) Archival documents that have been assigned some level of secrecy classification or whose publication may harm national security and interests, the country’s external relations, or the rights of individuals shall retain these attributes after they are transferred to the Directorate General and may not be opened for scholarly research.  The Directorate General may decide to remove secrecy classifications from certain archival documents in consultation with [the agency from which the archival document originated] and within the framework of laws.”

The fifth paragraph is also of interest (though standard): 

“(5) Access to archival documents by domestic and foreign real and corporate persons and the implementation of procedures and principles stated in this article shall be governed by a statute of regulations.”

This paragraph is typical of virtually all Turkish laws which pass on the responsibility of “implementation of procedures and principles” to lower levels of administration.  This provides deniability and vagueness in the case of laws that are known to be discriminatory in advance.  This is exactly the way the “Deportation Law” of 1915 and the “Wealth Tax Law” of 1942 (as well as the “Religious Foundations” laws of 2000 and 2007) were drafted: the laws did not mention the actual targets of the actions taken but statutes of regulations created at lower or local levels of administration targeted only certain groups.  This allowed the Ottoman and Turkish governments to deny charges that the laws they enacted were discriminatory against certain groups and to argue that “the laws were justified but the implementation went awry.”

In conclusion, although Milli Gazete’s claim that this bill is aimed at “self-defense” against Armenian genocide allegations is not readily apparent in the language of the bill, it is clear that the law provides substantial leeway to a wide range of Turkish government agencies to restrict selectively access to a very large set of sensitive documents.  The exemption from direct supervision given to “power agencies” such as the General Staff, the Presidency, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Intelligence Organization; together with the “secrecy” and “national security” exemptions of Article 25(4) and the vague implementation provisions through “statutes of regulations” provide sufficient tools to a fairly large and deep bureaucracy to deny access to any archival document on an arbitrarily selective basis.

The draft bill is expected to go to the National Assembly for discussion and enactment into law during the current legislative session.

In this article by a security analyst and a reader of this blog, who will remain anonymous per her/his request, the author deconstructs Turkey’s nationalist “survival” rhetoric.

The national discourse in Turkey that justifies the country’s current borders goes as follows, “European imperialists attempted to carve up the homeland, and the heroic Mustafa Kemal Gazi Pasha Ataturk stopped them.” This perception is not too farfetched when one considers the ulterior motives of the Sykes-Picot agreement, French ambitions in Cilicia, and the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia (although Greeks and Armenians comprised a majority of the city of Smyrna). However, when it comes to Turkey’s border with Georgia and Armenia, Turks usually tiptoe around the issue quietly, and may, if compelled to do so, mumble something unintelligible about Sevres’.

The 1920 Treaty of Sevres’ assigned to Armenia the provinces of Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, and a number of others. Turks justify their claim on this territory by citing demographics; Armenians constituted a minority in these areas. Made possible in part by the Armenian Genocide (aka “humane relocations”), this sly argument is indisputably correct. However, this rhetoric still does not account for present day borders, because it fails to account for the present day Turkish provinces of Ardahan, Kars, and Igdir (and also Artvin with respect to Georgia).

Turkey captured these provinces from the Democratic Republic of Armenia (DRA) in the 1920 Turkish-Armenian War.  With regard to this particular swath of territory, the Turkish anti-imperialist thesis breaks down entirely, and its advocates are forced to mention the Ottoman-Russian border prior to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. This is truly ridiculous and ad-hoc reasoning, because it would have also entitled Turkey to conquer Libya, Syria, Albania, Bulgaria, and many other countries. Moreover, it does not even apply to Igdir, which had previously belonged to Persia.[i] Turkey’s rationale is further tarnished because it is based on treaties made by the Ottoman Empire, which were repudiated by the Turkish Revolutionary Movement, and in addition would be an association that genocide deniers adamantly argue does not exist.

The capture of these territories also invalidates Turkey’s demographics argument regarding the Sevres’ territories, because Armenians constituted a vast majority in Kars, Igdir, and probably Ardahan.[ii]After hearing this almost universally accepted fact, some Turks will then say that Muslims once constituted a majority in those provinces, but Armenian immigrants swamped them, and that the Russians also exiled the Muslims. However, not only are Turks largely responsible for this demographic shift since many Armenian immigrants came as a result of the Genocide/“relocations,” but by using the principle of historical demographics, Turkey once again undermines its claims regarding the Sevres’ Treaty territories assigned to Armenia. As recently as the mid-nineteenth century, Armenians constituted a majority in the province of Van, and the Ottoman Empire purposely settled Circassian refugees in this area for the express purpose of diluting this majority; this similar to what China is doing to Tibet.[iii] If one wanted to go even further back in history, he would find that Armenians constituted a majority in the territories north of Van as well.

As a measure of last resort, Turks will cite the skirmishes between the DRA and the Turkish speaking tribes in Olti. The Turkish revolutionaries were justified in conquering this region, they will say, in order to liberate their ethnic and religious kin across the border. This argument has several fatal flaws however. First, Turks must acknowledge that the Otli tribes were armed insurrectionists, and in doing so, must either stop yapping incessantly about armed Armenian rebels in order to justify the Genocide, or they must accept that the Armenians would have been entirely justified in “relocating” the Olti tribes in the exact same manner that the Turks “relocated” the Armenians; ultimately ensuring the tribes’ destruction by rape, pillage, and massacre. Lastly, they must also retroactively accept as just, the Russian invasions of Anatolia over the previous century, as those incursions were also conducted under the pretext of liberating coreligionists from infidel oppression.

In essence the Turkish view regarding these three provinces can best be described by using a fortress as an analogy; where, in order to sure up one wall, a Turkish advocate must cannibalize stones from another wall from the same fortress. The conquest of these territories cannot be justified on the basis of demographics, as the Armenians would have equal claim to Van. Nor can it be justified on the basis of the 1877 border, as that links the Turkish Revolutionaries to the genocidal Ottoman Empire. And lastly, it cannot be justified using the Olti tribes, because that undermines their “arguments,” which deny the veracity of the Armenian Genocide. Instead, the truth of the matter is that the Turkish Revolutionaries invaded the DRA simply because they were superior in numbers and arms, because they still had imperialist ambitions, and because they had a deep seated hatred for Armenians; clearly evidenced by Kazim Karabekir’s yearning to obliterate the ruins of Ani purely out of spite. Present day Turks need look more objectively at the past, and stop seeing their ancestors only as innocent victims who fought a just war for survival against insidious imperialists and Gavourler.

[i] Ragip Zarakolu’s “Accusing Armena of denying Kars Treaty, does not Turkey provoke it to refuse recognizing Igdir as Turkish territory?”

[ii] VirtualAni.org  see page on Melville Carter, “The Land Of The Stalking Death: a Journey Through Starving Armenia on an American Relief Train.”

[iii] Van’s Armenian Majority found in Louise Nalbandian’s The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, and resettlement of Circassians found in Taner Akcam’s From Empire to Republic : Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide.

While there is no single designated mass grave of Armenians in the Republic of Turkey, there are dozens of monuments, streets, and even schools honoring the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide.

Some time ago I reflected on the fate of genocide-honoring monuments in Turkey in the aftermath of a possible Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

Now, a long but interesting article in Londoon Review of Books – brought to my attention by fellow blogger Raffi Kojian – details some genocide memorials in Turkey.

[…]

Finally, there is the Armenian genocide, its authors honoured in streets and schools across the country, whose names celebrate the murderers. Talat: a boulevard in Ankara, four avenues in Istanbul, a highway in Edirne, three municipal districts, four primary schools. Enver: three avenues in Istanbul, two in Izmir, three in occupied Cyprus, primary schools in Izmir, Mugla, Elazig. Cemal Azmi, responsible for the deaths of thousands in Trabzon: a primary school in that city. Resit Bey, the butcher of Diyarbekir: a boulevard in Ankara. Mehmet Kemal, hanged for his atrocities: thoroughfares in Istanbul and Izmir, statues in Adana and Izmir, National Hero Memorial gravestone in Istanbul. As if in Germany squares, streets and kindergarten were called after Himmler, Heydrich, Eichmann, without anyone raising an eyebrow. Books extolling Talat, Enver and Sakir roll off the presses, in greater numbers than ever. Nor is all this merely a legacy of a Kemalist past. The Islamists have continued the same tradition into the present. If Talat’s catafalque was borne by armoured train from the Third Reich for burial with full honours by Inönü in 1943, it was Demirel who brought Enver’s remains back from Tajikistan in 1996, and reburied them in person at a state ceremony in Istanbul. Beside him, as the cask was lowered into the ground, stood the West’s favourite Muslim moderate: Abdullah Gul, now AKP president of Turkey.

[…]

The rest of the article is an interesting read.

Thursday morning I had my first guest lecture – through videoconference – for an Anthropology class on Truth and Reconciliation at the Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). My topic was the Armenian Genocide, and what are the prospects for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.

Thursday afternoon, I received an e-mail from a young Turkish woman from Scotland. She wrote:

hi

i stumbled across your blog and just wanted to thank you. i am a turkish girl studying in scotland, my mother and our family come from malatya. my grandfather is an apricot farmer. well, he used to be. he is a very old man now. he has been saying for a few years now that he won’t be seeing very many more springs come into bloom. i’ve read a few of posts (i will sit down and devour more, i am actually meant to be writing a paper at the moment) the Hasan Cemal one really hit a nerve.
my mother knew Hrant Dink. when he use to phone her, he use to call her “Toprağım” (my earth/my land).
i’ve never seen her mourn the way she did when he was murdered.
i am not in the habit of writing such strangely emotional emails.
i am trying and not really succeeding, i am not entirely sure why i am crying in front of my laptop, for what it is worth in it’s own little way – i am sorry. i feel that your blog and the insight and information it provides is wonderful and do keep up the good work.

Thank you.

This e-mail brought smile to my face. The hours I had spent preparing my lecture was not worthless. Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is not only possible, but it is happening right now on some personal levels.

Anyway, here are a few excerpts from my 10-page (double spaced) talk this morning which was followed by questions from IUPUI students.

[…]

I have no records of a family tree that goes back before 1915 even though the world’s oldest map that we know shows Armenia as one of the few countries known to the ancient Babylonians. Naturally, I was brought up to hate those who committed the genocide. But, as a child, I was also taught of a kind Turkish woman who saved my father’s grandmother during the genocide and kept her as her own daughter for eight years.

I am alive because a Turkish woman helped my great-grandmother escape a Turkish massacre in 1915. So, naturally, the seeds to reconciliation between Armenians and Turks are to be found in harsh history itself.

(Later I reviewed the history of the Armenian Genocide and what has happened in the last 90 years in the conflict.) 

As some of you may know, Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul visited Armenia last month to watch a soccer match together. Referred to as “soccer diplomacy,” this move was initiated by Armenia’s new and perhaps undemocratically elected president Serzh Sargsyan. Both presidents took huge risks by attending this unprecedented and historic event, and many people hoped this could be the start of a better future.

Today’s Armenia is a small, landlocked country with a decreasing population and a sad history. It’s most advanced neighbor, Turkey, has committed a genocide that it say never took place. If Turkey opens the border, Armenia could have access to open markets and business would benefit Armenia. But many Armenians, especially Armenians in the Diaspora, feel that Turkey must recognize the Armenian Genocide before Turkey and Armenia can become friends. And many Turks, think that Armenia should destroy its Genocide Memorial and forget history before Turkey should open the border.

Surprisingly, the leadership of the Republic of Armenia and Turkey seem to be open to change – openly supported by the West. Last month’s “soccer diplomacy” is a good public image for Turkey and a real economic opportunity for Armenia, but the question that haunts us is whether reconciliation or truth comes first. Will an unconditional reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey move Turks to recognize the Genocide? Does Armenia have the right to reconcile with Turkey without the Diaspora’s concern? Who is the Armenian Diaspora? Who speaks for the Diaspora? Nationalist leaders or people who spend money to their families in Armenia every month?

And, finally, what is it that will make Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide? What if Turkey doesn’t democratize for another 90 years.

These are questions with no satisfying or simple answers, but questions that raise the underlying issue of justice. Perhaps if Turkey is not ready to recognize the Armenian Genocide, it can start protecting and renovating Armenian sacred sites – cathedrals and cemeteries – places of memory that are the only proof that a historic Armenia once existed in what is today Turkey. Perhaps the Armenian Diaspora can establish more ties with progressive people in Turkey and tell them that even though we will never forget the Armenian Genocide, we will also never forget the kindness of those Turks who helped us during the Genocide. The path to reconciliation is impossible without acknowledging the past, but admitting realities can start with little things such as accepting that Armenians and Turks are human beings who have lived together for hundreds of years, that we both share values of justice, fairness, hospitality and family. That no matter how hard we try, we will never stop being neighbors.  

I am an optimist, and I think Armenians and Turks will one day see some part of themselves in each others’ eyes.

Below is Ara Arabyan’s translation of retired Turkish diplomat Volkan Vural’s interview with Taraf  (Sep 8, 2008), where the former Ambassador says Turkey must apologize to Armenians.

“[Duzel] In response to an invitation by the president of Armenia, President Abdullah Gul went to Yerevan to watch the soccer game [between the Turkish and Armenian national teams].  We have a dispute with Armenia over historical events.  Was not the Armenian president’s invitation to Gul before the resolution of this dispute a political risk for himself?

[Vural] Of course it was a risk.  The decision to invite the Turkish president to the soccer game was not an easy decision for Armenia.  We view the world solely through our own lens.  We must also look at events from the perspective of others.  There is a neurosis about Turkey in Armenia.  Consequently, it is not easy to make any decision related to Turkey.  Politicians may have to pay–indeed have paid–a high price for such decisions.

[Duzel] Who paid such a high price?

[Vural] Former President Levon Ter Petrosyan was ousted from office because he sought a solution to the Karabakh problem and to establish ties with Turkey.  They made him pay the price of establishing ties with Turkey.  Today, even though a major portion of the people of Armenia want relations [with Turkey] to develop and the borders [between the two countries] to open–the Turkey dossier is not so easy to handle as it is thought.

[Duzel] Is it easy to handle the Armenia dossier in Turkey?

[Vural] It is also difficult in Turkey.  However, the reality is that the problem between us and Armenia is not something that can be resolved by historians alone.  That is because this is psychological and political issue rather than a historical matter.  There is a certain psychology, distrust, fear, and terror that the events of the past have created among people.

[Duzel] Do you not think that Armenian and Turkish historians can solve this problem if they discuss the events of the past freely and describe them objectively?

[Vural] A solution to this problem cannot be found via history alone, because a solution requires overcoming the psychological problems this issue has created among people.  A solution requires the creation of a climate of trust in which the two peoples can draw closer with affection and respect and where they can talk to each other with ease.  This is not a situation that historians can overcome.  The Armenian question is a problem that needs to solved by politicians, not historians.  History can only shed light on certain issues and play a role that facilitates a solution.  That is all.

[Duzel] Do you think that any diplomatic steps will be taken in the aftermath of the [Turkish] president’s visit to Armenia?

[Vural] I expect and hope that they will be taken.  This visit may serve as the foundation of a new beginning between Turkey and Armenia.  Diplomatic relations between the two states must be established without delay.

[Duzel] What do you mean by “diplomatic relations”?

[Vural] “Diplomatic relations” means Turkish diplomats are resident in Yerevan and Armenian diplomats are resident in Ankara.  This would mean a normal relationship between the two states, which would mean the opening of borders between them.  The first step in the normalization of relations must be the exchange of representative missions in the two countries.  We have to sign an agreement and say that “we will exchange embassies with each other.”  The opening of the borders is not a necessity just for the Armenians.  I have seen that border gate.

[Duzel] What did you see?

[Vural] I went to the Alican [Margara] border gate [from the Armenian side].  I waved to our soldiers from afar.  This gate is 10 to 15 kilometers away from Yerevan.  Look, we have been in contact with Armenia, which gained independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, since 1991.

[Duzel] How so?

[Vural] For example, I am the first Turkish ambassador who visited Armenia.  At that time I was [Turkish] ambassador to Moscow.  This was the time when Armenia was on its way to becoming independent.  Shnork Kalustian, then the Armenian patriarch in Turkey, had died during his visit to Yerevan.  I sent a message to the Armenian president.  I wrote in my message that “taking an interest in the funeral of the patriarch, who is our citizen, and facilitating the return of his remains to Turkey is my duty” and that “I am prepared to contribute in every way, including attending any ceremonies that may be held.”

[Duzel] Did you do this in consultation with Ankara?

[Vural] No, I did it at my own initiative, because the patriarch was a Turkish citizen.  He was the spiritual leader of one of our religious minorities.  There was no relationship whatsoever between Armenia and Turkey.  At that time, Armenia was one of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union.  As Turkish ambassador to Moscow, it fell within my purview like the other Soviet republics.  [Kalustyan’s] funeral rites were conducted in the Armenian church in Moscow.  I attended that ceremony to the astonishment of the Armenians who were there.  They were really taken aback by the presence of a Turkish ambassador at a funeral ceremony in an Armenian church.  This was my first contact with Armenia as ambassador.

[Duzel] Did these contacts with Armenia continue?  If they did, how did they go?

[Vural] The contacts continued.  They invited me to Armenia on a winter day.  Ter Petrosyan was president.  Armenia was in dramatic conditions.  It was suffering tremendous deprivations, including the lack of any electricity.  I had a long and very useful meeting with President Ter Petrosyan about ways of developing Turkish-Armenian relations and dissipating hostility between the two nations.  Ter Petrosyan shared my views.

[Duzel] What did Ter Petrosyan, who is the leader of the main opposition party today, tell you

[Vural] He said:  “I cannot forget the agony of the past, but I do not want to be stuck in the past.  As a responsible statesman, I have to think about the future of my grandchildren.  I sincerely want the development of relations with Turkey.”  At that time, Turkey was perturbed by developments such as Armenia’s new constitution and declaration of independence.

[Duzel] Do certain expressions in the Armenian constitution and its declaration of independence still annoy Turkey?

[Vural] They still annoy Turkey.  However, Ter Petrosyan gave me the impression that these issues can be overcome and I conveyed this situation to Ankara in a lengthy report.  Subsequently, republics seceding from the Soviet Union declared their independence.  At that point, I returned to Ankara and all this information was evaluated.

[Duzel] Yes.

[Vural] During those meetings, it was decided that Turkey should recognize the independence of all the republics and that it should establish diplomatic ties with all of them except Armenia.  Unfortunately, Turkey did not establish diplomatic ties with Armenia.  This is a period that I have always seen as “lost years” for Turkey and that I have found most regrettable.   This is the year 1991 and immediately after that.  By 1993, matters were completely out of control, and Armenia occupied Nagorno Karabakh.

[Duzel] Had diplomatic relations with Armenia been established then, what would be happening now?  Would the Armenian question have been resolved?

[Vural] There would still be an Armenian question in Turkey, but Turkey would be a country that has normalized its relations with Armenia.  Both sides would have benefited from this normalization.  In other words, we would have had a different evolution and a different game, and this would have had an effect on the Diaspora Armenians.  However, we could not create this equilibrium like a great power.  I also think that this normalization would have helped to improve ties between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  The occupation of Nagorno Karabakh could perhaps be prevented.  However, we did not pay the necessary attention to Ter Petrosyan then; we failed to help him and to seize the moment.  Later, Ter Petrosyan was ousted and [Robert] Kocharian became president.  Kocharian pursued radical policies of Armenian nationalism.  Had we helped Ter Petrosyan to alleviate the deprivations in his country, nationalism in Armenia might not have been so rabid.

[Duzel] At that time [Turgut] Ozal was president and [Suleyman] Demirel was prime minister of a True Path Party-Social Democratic People’s Party coalition.  Who opposed the establishment of diplomatic ties with Armenia?  Was it the bureaucrats or the politicians?

[Vural] Many people within the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry opposed this.  Ozal was very upset that this opportunity was missed.  The [Armenian] declaration of independence naturally made many references to western Armenia–that is Turkish soil–and pledged efforts to win recognition for the genocide.  That gave the impression that Armenia has territorial claims on Turkey.  All these could have been overcome with the establishment of diplomatic relations.  I already had prepared some proposals to change the declaration of independence.  However, there was opposition to this at the time.

[Duzel] Why was there opposition?

[Vural] I see that as a lack of courage.  I reported my meeting with Ter Petrosyan but [ellipsis].  Had we established diplomatic relations, Turkey would not be in the tight corner it is now across the world over the Armenian question.  It would not have been so easy to condemn a Turkey that maintains very good relations with Armenia.  We should not be too preoccupied with the matter of genocide on this issue.

[Duzel] So what must we do?

[Vural] We are an important country of this region.  Peace and stability in this region is to our advantage.  From a wider perspective, the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia are very important in terms of the interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.  When I say “we should not be too preoccupied with allegations of genocide,” I mean the following:  Allegations of genocide have become a vehicle of survival for the Diaspora.  The allegation of genocide has become an industry; it has created its own people, entrepreneurs, politicians, artists, and money mechanisms.

[Duzel] Has not Turkey become too obsessed with genocide by not establishing relations with Armenia?

[Vural] In effect, yes.  The development of relations between Turkey and Armenia would not entirely push aside allegations of genocide but [ellipsis].  Ter Petrosyan once pointed at the Alican border gate and told me:  “Look, if this gate is opened, people will see and know each other; they will commingle with each other.  We will end up buying many things we need from you.  This will help the resolution of the problems of the past.”  However, we have a strange reticence.  We are a country with too many red lines and taboos.  We are told that “Armenia is hostile to us” and that “it has territorial claims on Turkey.”  It is time to distinguish between rhetoric and the realities of life.

[Duzel] What are the realities of life?

[Vural] People may say, demand, and dream certain things rhetorically.  They may dream about a very large Armenia.  There is no limit to dreaming.  However, the realities are evident.  Can Armenia take any land from Turkey?  Which sensible person can contemplate that?  The number of soldiers in our armed forces is as big as the entire population of Armenia.  We must have more confidence in ourselves.

[Duzel] The man in the street may harbor fears or may be made to harbor fears, but how do you explain the phobias and red lines of military and civilian bureaucrats who know the realities?

[Vural] This is Turkey.  The Foreign Ministry is cautious, as expected.  Acting with extreme caution is a rule of that profession, but no problem can be solved without taking any risks.  This also partly reflects a desire to avoid the risk of being criticized by the Turkish public.  The entire problem is this:  There is a certain circumstance and you can either become the slave of that circumstance or find ways of changing it.  We became a slave of the circumstances.

[Duzel] Turkey became a slave of the Armenian question.

[Vural] Yes.  We should have sought another equation to solve this issue, but the risk was not taken out of fears of making mistakes and facing criticism at home.  As a result, we reduced ourselves to the point of doing nothing.

[Duzel] As diplomatic relations develop with Armenia, will the events of the past be discussed?

[Vural] They will be discussed inevitably.  In my opinion, this is not an impediment blocking the normalization of relations.  The term “genocide” is a descriptor that was created long after our historic events.  However, this descriptor has become largely banal today.  Every inhuman act is termed “genocide” at some point.  There is little doubt that the events we went through had very painful and tragic aspects.  There is also little doubt that the Armenians see them as a tremendous act of injustice against them.  It is fact that they think that they were forcefully uprooted from the places where they were born and raised.  You cannot erase those sentiments.  You cannot tell them not to think this way.  Nonetheless, you can tell them:  “Yes, these events occurred, but we cannot spend our lives on those events.  We have another life ahead of us.  Let us build that life together in friendship.”

[Duzel] Does Armenia really expect only this little from Turkey in connection with history?  Is it enough to say these to them to establish peace?

[Vural] The Armenians will of course stir up the issue of genocide.  They will seek ways of doing that.  There will always be movements to make the entire world accept this position.  In the meantime, the establishment of a “joint history commmission” between the two countries may, at first glance, be a good step forward, but I think that Armenia is not in a position to make a significant contribution with respect to history.  In my opinion, the problem is not in history.  I do not share the assumption that the historical facts are not known.  The facts are known.  Very many things are known.  The whole problem is how these known facts are perceived, what marks they have left, and how those marks can affect the future.

[Duzel] I did not understand.

[Vural] An Armenian may sincerely think that what happened to his nation was genocide.  We may think otherwise.  If we get stuck on this, we cannot get anywhere.  Arguing that “the historians should clarify this to us” means giving too much importance to historians.  Every historian has a different interpretation of every event.  The problem revolves around how the psychological problem will be overcome.  Ter Petrosyan told me:  “Let us put that issue to one side.  Let us look at the future.  It is obvious that we will not reach an agreement on this issue.  We should allow the two peoples to commingle by other means.  Let us bypass the genocide issue this way.”  I also think that this is what needs to be done.  There is no point in delving too much into this issue.

[Duzel] There is a very large Armenian Diaspora, mainly in the United States and France.  Will they not insist on the recognition of the genocide?

[Vural] Of course they will.  However, if relations between Turkey and Armenia improve, the Diaspora cannot have its present influence.  This is because the people of Armenia will see the concrete benefits of good neighborly ties.  When the borders open, trade will grow and they will become rich.

[Duzel] Could Turkey acknowledge that the Ittihadists perpetrated a great massacre of the Armenians?

[Vural] That would be hard.  I think that we painted ourselves into a corner.  Initially, we acted as if nothing like this happened.  Now we are saying that “yes, some things happened but they were reciprocal.”  I do not know where these discussions may go tomorrow, but I think certain psychological steps may be taken on this issue.

[Duzel] What can be done?

[Vural] What would I do if I was in a position of authority?  I would say:  “All Armenians and members other minorities who lived within the current borders of Turkey at the time of the Ottoman Empire and who were subjected to deportation in one way or another–even if this deportation was to other regions of the Empire–will be admitted to Turkish citizenship automatically if they request it.”  I do not know how many people would take up this offer, but, at a minimum, people who were driven out of their villages, towns, or cities by force would have been told:  “The republic is granting you and people of your ancestry the right to return and to become citizens of this country.”  People who apply would be granted this right.

[Duzel] So what would happen to the properties and assets the Armenians left behind during the deportation?

[Vural] These can be discussed.  A fund may be established.  The return of the properties and providing a full accounting for them is now very difficult, but a symbolic reparation is possible.  What matters is that we show that we are not insensitive in the face of a painful situation, that we empathize with the situation, and that we are considering certain ways of compensation as a humanitarian responsibility.  I would actually apologize.  It is quite debatable under what conditions but [ellipsis].  Regardless, if someone is forced to leave this country [ellipsis].  I do not mean this only for Armenians.  I also mean it with respect to people who left after the 6-7 September [1955] incidents.  I mean it with respect to our Greek citizens.

[Duzel] When you say “apologize,” what form of apology do you have in mind?

[Vural] These events are unbecoming for Turkey.  We do not approve them.  The people who were forced to leave this country have our sympathy.  We see them as our brothers.  If they wish, we are prepared to admit them to Turkish citizenship.

[Duzel] And we apologize for the pain we have caused them.

[Vural] Yes. For the pain [ellipsis].  Yes.  These are the best steps that can be taken.  This is what a state like ours should do.”